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Nevada ex. rel Bd. of Parole Comm’rs v. Morrow, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (May 26, 2011)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – ADMINSTRATIVE LAW
Summary
An appeal from a district court order clarifying a judgment granting a writ of mandamus,
and a proper person appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss
Disposition/Outcome
The appeal from the district order clarifying a judgment granting a writ of mandamus was
reversed and the order granting the motion to dismiss was affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
Morrow Appeal
The Nevada Board of Parole (the “Parole Board”) denied Marrow‟s parole. Morrow
challenged the Parole Board‟s procedure by filing a writ of mandamus in the district court
seeking a new parole hearing.2 The district court granted the writ and ordered that the Parole
Board: (1) give Morrow a new hearing; (2) provide him with proper notice of the hearing; (3)
give him the opportunity to speak or have a representative speak on his behalf at the hearing; and
(4) provide him with a copy of his risk assessment file. Morrow received a new hearing, but the
Parole Board did not provide him notice of the new hearing and Morrow was once again denied
parole. Morrow sought a district court order to show cause why the Parole Board should not be
in contempt. The district court denied the order to show cause, but directed the Parole Board to
turn over every document it considered when it denied Morrow Parole.
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By Danielle Woodrum.
Morrow argued his due process rights were violate because the board did not notify him of the hearing and denied
him access to the documents it relied on.
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Kamedula Appeal
Kamedula was also denied parole. He argued that the Parole Board violated Nevada‟s
Open Meeting Law and denied him certain due process rights including the ability to present
certain evidence and the ability to cross examine witnesses during the hearing.
Discussion
Justice Hardesty, writing for a unanimous three-justice panel of the Supreme Court of
Nevada held that despite recent Nevada case law recognizing the Parole Board as a quasi-judicial
body3 and discussing the due process protections afforded in quasi-judicial proceedings,4
constitutional due process rights do not attach to parole release hearings because no liberty
interest is at stake.5
The Court held that Due Process rights do not apply to parole release hearings in Nevada.
The Court stated that due process protections apply only when government action deprives a
person of liberty or property and that a conviction extinguishes one‟s liberty right to be released
before the expiration of a valid sentence.6 However, the court noted that a state may create an
“expectancy of release . . . entitled to some measure of constitutional protection.”7 However, the
Court reasoned that Nevada‟s parole statute8 “only gives rise to a „hope‟ of release on parole”
and does not create any liberty or property interest sufficient to create a cause of action against
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Witherow v .State. Bd. of Parole Comm‟rs, 123 Nev. 305, 311-12, 167 P.3d 408, 412 (2007).
Stockmeier v. State Dep‟t of Corrections, 122 Nev. 385, 135 P.3d 220 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by
Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 270, 672 n.6 (2008).
5
Id. In Stockmeier, the Court held that Psychological Review Panel hearings were quasi-judicial hearings and
therefore exempt from Nevada‟s Open Meeting Law. Id.
6
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 443 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
7
Id.
8
NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.10705
4

the State.9 Thus, the Court concluded that Nevada‟s statutes on parole hearings do not create a
liberty interest sufficient to afford due process protections.
The Court also reviewed its decision in Stockmeier concerning whether administrative
proceedings have a “judicial character.” The Court focused on whether such proceedings
maintained trial-like attributes.10 However, the Court held that “[i]nasmuch as Stockmeier has
caused some confusion about the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings in Nevada, we take this
opportunity to expressly adopt and clarify the application of the judicial function test in this
state.”
The Court noted that a judicial function test determines the nature of an administrative
hearing by examining the administrative entity‟s functions.11 The Court expressly adopted the
judicial function test for determining whether entities act in a quasi-judicial manner when
performing their administrative duties. Thus, the Court clarified that due process protections
afforded during a proceeding do not, alone, determine whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial.
The Court held that procedural protections go to the ability of the hearing entity to hear witnesses
and make decisions affecting property rights and is only one consideration in determining
whether the hearing entity is performing a judicial function.

9

Weakland v. Bd. of Parole Comm‟rs 100 Nev. 218, 220 (1984).
Stockmeier at 391-92, 135 P.3d at 224. The Court linked quasi-judicial proceedings to four due process rights:
(1) the ability to present and object to evidence; (2) the ability to cross examine witnesses; (3) a written decision
form the public body; and (4) an opportunity to appeal to a higher authority. Id. Based on those considerations the
Court held that Psychological Review Panel hearings did not afford each of those due process rights and were
therefore not quasi-judicial. Id.
11
Witherow v .State. Bd. of Parole Comm‟rs, 123 Nev. 305, 312, 167 P.3d 408, 412 (2007). The Court noted the
factors other jurisdictions look at for the judicial function test are the hearings authority‟s ability to: exercise
judgment and discretion; hear and determine facts; make binding orders and judgments; affect the personal property
rights of private persons; examine witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a hearing; and enforce decisions
or impose penalties. Craig v. Stafford Const, 856 A.3d 372, 377 (Conn. 2004).
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Conclusion
Nevada‟s parole release statute does not create a liberty interest sufficient to invoke due
process protections, therefore inmates are not entitled to constitutional due process protections
regarding discretionary parole release. The judicial function test is explicitly adopted to
determine if an administrative hearing is quasi-judicial.

